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PART I-THE FACTS
l.

The Women's Legal Education and Action Fund ("LEAF') takes no position on the facts.

PART II-THE ISSUES
2.

LEAF adopts the statement of the constitutional questions as set forth in the Appellant

Attorney General's factum.

PART HI - ARGUMENT
A.

INTRODUCTION

3.

LEAF submits that the heterosexual definition of spouse ins. 29 of the Family Law Act

R. S.O. 1990 c. F .3 completely denies lesbians who otherwise meet the tl:1reshoidcriteria to apply for
a support award. The effect of this denial violates lesbians' right to equal benefit and protection of
the law contrary to s. 15(1) of the Charter, and cannot be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

B.

THE DEFINITION OF SPOUSE IN SECTION 29 OF THE FAMILY L4W ACT
DISCRIMINATESAGAINSTLESBIANSCONTRARYTOSECTION
1S(l)OFTHE
CHARTER.

I

20
4.

Guarantee of Equality

The Charter is the supreme law of Canada and, accordingly, statutes must be interpreted and

appiied in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enslhr:i.nedwithin the Charter. Where
a statute is capable of more than one interpretation, the interpretation which more closely accords
with Charter values should be favoured.

Siaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, at p. 1078
Hills et al. v. A.G. Canada, [1988] 1 SCR 513, at p. 558
Canada (Attorney General) v. A·fossop, [1993] 1 SCR 544 at pp. 581-82

30
5.

Section 15 has been recognized as "the broadest of all Charter guarantees". It applies to and

supports all other rights guaranteed by the Charter. The four equaiity guarantees contained in s. i 5
extend to both "the formulation and application of the law". Section 15 is to be given a broad and
generous interpretation consistent with realizing its fundamental purposes.

Andrews v. Law Society of British Columhia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at p. 171
Hills, supra, at p. 558

-2-

6.

In its evolving jurisprudence, this Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the

equality of disadvantaged groups. As Wilson J. (as she then was) stated, "s. 15 is designed to protect
those groups who suffer social, political and legal disadvantage in out society." Similarly Lamer C.J.
recognized that the purpose of s. 15 is to "remedy or prevent discrimination against groups subject
to stereotyping, historical disadvantage and political and social prejudice in Canadian society".
Andrews, supra, (per Wilson J.) at p. 154
R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 SCR 933, per Lamer C.J.
Egan v_ Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513
}.!iron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 SCR 418 at p. 436

II
7.

Whether There Has Been a s. 1- 1'

The Pro er Test for Dete
InfrinKement

This Court has recently identified three analytical approaches to the determination as to

\\-nether there has been a violation of the equality guarantee provided in s. 15(1 ). Regardiess of the
analysis used, LEAF submits that a majority of this Court has rejected importing considerations of
relevance into the s. 15 analysis. A focus on relevance
discriminatory impact of unconstitutional

invites courts to negate or ignore the

legislation and increases the opportunity for such

legislation to be upheld without having to undergo the more rigorous s. 1 scrutiny where the burden
20

is squarely on Governments to demonstrate that a violation of equality rights is demonstrably
justified.
Egan, supra, (per Cory, Sopinka, Iaccobucci, McLaughlin, L'Heureux-Dube J.J.) at
pp. 540-558
}Jiron, supra, (per McLaughlin, Iaccobucci, Sopinka, Cory, L 'Heureux-Dube J.J.) at pp. 465-

477
Benner v. The Secretary of State of Canada, [1997] 1 SCR 358 (per Iaccobucci J.) at pp. 389393
30

8.

In Andrews, this Court rejected as part of the first stage of the s. 15 analysis considerations

as to whether distinctions were reasonable in light of stated legislative objectives. In so doing this
Court recognized that such considerations would be properly situated under the s. 1 analysis, since
determinations as to the reasonableness of legislation requires inquiry into whether state interests
outweigh constitutional equality guarantees.

Likewise, LEAF submits that a focus on relevance

within the first branch of the s. 15(1) analysis as proposed in Egan and Miron fundamentally
undermines the purpose of the equality guarantee and runs counter to the analysis developed in
Andrews and the majority of subsequent equality cases.
9.
4O

LEAF submits that the s. 15 analysis proposed by McLaughlin J. in ivfiron and L'Heureux-

Dube Jin Egan and }Jiron places the proper focus in the analysis upon the purpose of the equality

"

-.)-

guarantee and the discriminatory impact of the distinction made by the impugned legisiation. \Vhile
the approach taken by each judge in determining the nature and impact of the distinction differs,
both analyses proceed within a purposive framework and wit.iiregard to the broader, social, po iiti cal,
context within which it is alleged that the s. 15(1) violation occurs. As a result, each analysis is
capabie of giving substantive meaning to our constitutional equality guarantees and would result in
a determination that the definition of spouse in s.29 of the Family Law Act violates s.15 on the basis
of sexual orientation.

(a)

10.

The Distinction

It has been well established by this Court that sexual orientation is an analogous ground

upon which discrimination is prohibited ,vithin s. 15(1).
Egan, supra, (per Cory J. at p.583-604, per L'Heuruex-Dube J.) at 540-568
11.

LEAF submits that s. 29 of the F amiiy Law Act makes a distinction between heterosexual

con1Inon law relationships and intimate lesbian relationships on the basis of sexual orientation and
as a result has a discriminatory effect. The Attorney General of Ontario concedes and LEAF agrees
that the Family Law Act provides a statutory benefit within the meaning of s. 15(1) and as same sex
intimate reiationships do not have the statutory right to seek such support, the definition of "spouse"
20

denies a benefit on the basis of sexual orientation.

Section 29 of the Family Law A.ct mandates the

wholesaie exclusion of lesbians from the right to apply for spousal support upon breakdown of
intimate relationships.
Attorney General factum at p. 15
12.

The Respondent H's argument that the distinction made by the legislation is between

heterosexual

relationships on the one hand and same sex and other "financially dependent"

relationships is erroneous because the distinction is not constitutionaily relevant.
30

13.

rt is not necessary, as the Attorney General and the Respondent Hand the Respondent M

suggests, that lesbian intimate relationships look 'just like" heterosexual common iaw relationships
as a condition to finding a s. 15 violation oflesbian equaiity rights. Although this issue is addressed
more completeiy in our s. 1 analysis, LEAF submits that for the purposes of s. 15 this Court has
clearly stated that similarity of situation is not the measure of entitlement to equality rights.
AfcKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990} 3 S.C.R. 229, at p. 279

It is also not incumbent upon a s. 15 claimant to prove that other possible avenues exist to
address or remedy the discriminatory effect of the impugned legislation or that those other avenues
are insufficient. The Attorney General and the respondent H's argument that lesbian intimates have
alternate remedies to inclusion within s. 29 of the F amiiy Law Act is deceptive. LEAF submits that
the onus rests with Government under s. l to demonstrate that other available avenues are sufficient
to wa.rra...>it
overriding a constitutionally protected right to equality.
(b)
15.
10

The Distinction Has a Discriminatory Effect

Parts L II, and III of the Family Law Act provide a comprehensive legislative scheme

designed to regulate the breakdown of intimate relationships which meet certain threshold
requirements.

The definition of spouse contained ins. 29 of the Family Law Act restricts the right

to apply fur spousal support exclusively to heterosexuals. It does not provide a guarantee of spousal
support upon application. Rather, the Family Law Act provides Judges with criteria which is to be
applied on a case by case basis in determining eligibility for and quantum of spousal support
16.

Lesbians and gay men have advanced equaiity claims before this

COlh'i:

and before lower

courts in Canada seeking inclusion into the legal construct of "family" and all of the subcategories
that fall within (eg. "spouse", "marital status", "family status").

Judges have resorted to various

interpretive devices \J,Tiichpermit a restrictive interpretation oflegislation which regulates "family".
20

Judges have justified excluding lesbians and gay men from definitions of "famiiy" to which legal
rights, recognition and protection are accorded, on the basis of outdated, monoiithic and theoretical
definitions which demonstmte a stronger commitment to ensuring that "famiiy" continues to be
defined as exclusively heterosexual. Such reasoning undermines the very societal values which the
equality provision of the Charter and the principles upon which human rights legislation is founded,
seek to uphold.
17.

This denial of recognition and protection and the concomitant denial of equal respect and

consideration chailenges the formation of lesbian relationships.
children, parentai obligations, commitment between the parties,
30

Regardless of the presence of
duration, expectations of the

parties, and degree of economic interdependence, intimate lesbian relationships are denied legal
protection, societal recognition and respect.

Such denial sends a clear message to the larger

Canadian society that lesbians, iesbian relationships and lesbian families including their children are
less worthy, less important and thus not entitled to equal recognition, protection and respect.

18.

LEAF submits that the distinction dra,vn by the legislation is between conunon law

heternsexual relationships and s&"1:le
sex intimate relationships.
analogous ground of sexual orientation.

The distinction is based upon the

It denies lesbians equal benefit and protection of the

spousal support provisions of the Family Law Act in that lesbians are statutorily denied the right
to apply for spousal support regardless of the economic consequences of the relationship upon either
party. The distinction has the effect of promoting and perpetuating the view that lesbians are less
worthy, less capabie and less valuable as human beings and as members of Canadian society and
therefore not equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.

10

SECTION 1
C.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE
CHARTER OF JUSTIFYING THE DISCRIMINATION

19.

Tne burden
is on governriienf
fo-sliow 6yclear and-convincing evidence that a violation of

a Charter right is "reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". The
factors generally relevant to determining whether a violative law meets that standard "remain those
set out in Oakes." Hence, government's burden is discharged when it demonstrates that the objective
20

behind the offending measure is pressing and substantial, and that the infringement is proportional
to that objective.

Proportionaiity, in turn, requires that the limiting measures (i) be "carefully

designed, or rationally connected, to the objective"; (ii) "impair the right as little as possible"; and
(iii) not generate effects whlch so "severely trench on individual or group rights that the legislative
objective, albeit important, is nevertheless outweighed by the abridgment of rights."

Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 169.
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R.103,atpp.136-140.
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at p. 768.
RJR-AfacDonald Inc. v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at p. 268.

30
20.

LEAF urges this Court to hold that the Ontario government has not met its burden of

demonstrating that the infringement of lesbians' equaiity rights occasioned by s. 29 of the Family

Law Act is justified at all, far less demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Notwithstanding Ontario's attempt to skew the s. 1 analysis by mischaracterizing the true purpose
behind the support laws, the impugned provision (i) is not rationally connected to its aims, (ii) does
not minimally impair the equality rights oflesbians; and (iii) does not produce actual salutary effects
which outweigh their actual hanns. It is, therefore, unconstitutional.

-6-

I
When a government attempts to justify the infringement of a Charter right or freedom, it
must show that the objective it sought to achieve was pressing and substantial enough to "warrant

overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom". It is not open to a government to assign
to an impugned measure a purpose that seems, in retrospect, to be constitutionally more attractive.

Rather, "cogent and persuasive evidence" of the actual purpose of "those who drafted and enacted
the legislation at the time" is required before this standard may be satisfied.
R. v. Big Af Drug Afart Ltd., [1985] l S.C.R. 295, at pp. 335-36, 352.
R. v. Oakes, supra, at p. 138.
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at p.558.

10

22.

LEAF submits that, in arguing that the purpose of the impugned measu...-res
was to address the

"particular vulnerabilities suffered by heterosexual women upon relationship breakdown",

the

Ontario government cannot meet its burden under s. l . Although in other circumstances this
objective might pass constitutional muster, there is no evide11ce, far less cogent and persuasive
evidence, that this was the single objective the legisiature had in mind in enacting Part III. In fact,
the legislative history, the terms of the statute itself, and the record of its interpretation all show that

the legislature's actual purposes were threefold: (i) to reduce the burden on the public purse by
20

creating a private obligation to provide spousal support; (ii) to impose legal duties on spouses to treat
one another in a..,economically fair fashion upon relationship breakdown and to provide a meai.is

through which such disputes could be resolved; and (iii) to assist heterosexual women.
Attorney General's Factum, at p. 20.

(a)
23.

Legislative History

When first enacted in 1937, family law legislation in Ontario provided that only married

women who had been "deserted'' by their husbands had the right to apply for spousal support, and

30

then only so long as they conformed to prevailing notions of how a "good wife" should behave:
women who had engaged in adultery were automatically disentitled to support, irrespective of their

contributions to the marriage, their dependency or their need.
Deserted Wives and Children's _Maintenance Act, R.S.O. 1937, c. 211, (as amended by SO
1054 C. 22; 1958 C. 23; 1960 C. 105; 1970 C. 128; 1971 C. 98; 1973 S. 133)

24.

In the 1970's, the provincial government began to recognize that the paternalistic notions

about women which had undergirded the support laws since their inception no longer comported with

,..,
-,-

contemporary sensibilities. Whatever justification remained for providing women with the right to
apply for spousal support, it could not rest upon antiquated and discriminatory notions about
women's proper place. The legislature thus enacted a series of revisions to the support laws designed
to remove adultery as a statutory bar to entitlement together with other vestiges of legislated sex
inequality.

Famiiy Law Reform Act, S.O. 1975, c. 4L
Family Law Reform Act, S.O. 1978, c. 2.
25.
10

This shift in legislative policy had far less to do with ensuring that the support laws were

harmonized with society's changing views about how women's inequality was to be understood and
redressed than the Attorney Generai's history of this statute suggests. The 1975 Act, for example,
was denounced as "neanderthal" and an "affront to women" because it failed to value fully women's
contributions within the domestic context. Likewise, the government's claim that the 1978 Act
recognized the equality of the sexes was rejected as "spurious'' because it did nothing to correct the

"'"'t)aSIC
inequality oIThe sexes" existing within larger society. Some members' of the·tegis1ature
objected that the legislation betrayed the sarne "protective" posture toward women for their "ovm
good" that had long defined government policy on family law matters.

See Hansards, June 20, i975 at p. 3210-11; and November 18, 1976, at p. 750.

20
26.

In any event, it wouid be a distortion of history to ignore the fact that the legislature's

ostensibie concern for women's equality was but one of "severai basic themes" underlying the
legislative initiative of the 1970's.

The legislative history reveals that government was also

concerned that denying men the right to apply for support was unjustified in light of changing
economic realities. Not oniy had women in general become less economically reliant on their male
intimates as a general matter, but individual men too could find themselves dependent upon t..heir
female partners for economic support. Indeed, government papers produced at the time noted that
the very stereotypes about women's economic vulnerability here invoked by the Attorney General
were no longer apposite.

30
Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, Family Law Reform
Position Paper) 1979 at p. 9.
27.

(Government

Indeed, one of the primary reasons the government enacted this reform legislation was to

insulate the public coffers from the claims of women who, having been left impoverished upon
separation or divorce, were increasingly turning to the welfare system for support. The government
complained publicly that it had paid out more than $160 million per year in family benefits to such

-8-

claimants, and that part of its purpose in enacting legislation which expanded the scope of private
law obligations was to lessen this strain upon the pubiic purse.

See Hansards, November 22, 1976, at o. 4898; November 18, 1976, at p. 4793; and
November 22, 1976, at p. 4890-91.
·
28.

It was as a result of these shifts i..r1
the economic and social spheres that the legislature sought

to implement legislation that conferred ''no priviieges" and imposed "no disability on either men or
women as a group", but instead emphasized the "individual situation in each matrimonial dispute."
Thus, the overarching aim of the Act was to prescribe a "code of economic relations between the
10

spouses upon the severance of that union" to ensure that economic fairness was done.

See Hansards, October 26, 1976, at p. 4102; and October 18, 1977, at p. 901.
(b)
29.

The Structure of the Act
~

------"'-~~-

-- --

... ~'

.~---

'

. --

~,...,

>

The multipie aims the legislature sought to achieve in amending the support laws are reflected

in the terms of Part III of the Act. For example, the specific provisions establishing both the right
to receive and the obligation to provide support are cast in entirely sex-neutral terms. An application
20

for an_order of support may be made by a "dependant" (s. 33(2)), who is a "person" to whom another
owes support obligations (s. 29). Those obligations are borne by "spouses" (s. 30) \ltilo, according
to the Act's definitions set forth in ss. 29 and 1(l ), may be "either of a ma11and woman".
30.

In like marn1er,the guidelines contained ins. 33(9) to which cou.rts are to refer in determining

the amount and duration of support awarded in individual cases make no reference to the systemic
inequality of women, the greater earning capacity of men, or the tendency of women in heterosexual
relationships to assume primary responsibility for the care and raising of children. Instead, colli'i:S
are statutorily directed to consider the applicant's assets and means (subss. (a) and (b)), capacity to
contribute or provide support (subss. (c) and (d)), age and physical and mental health (subs. (e)),
30

needs (subs. (f)), and ability to become self-supporting (subs. (g))--factors that may be characteristic
of women's inequaiity but are by no means unique to it.
31.

Those sections that set forth the purposes which

&'l

order of support should serve are also

profoundly silent about the "special" needs of heterosexual women. Even in the Preamble, wbere
the Ontario legislature was free to express its intentions in pure policy terms, not a word was spoken
about this purported goal. On the contrary, there it is said that the legislature's intent is to recognize
spouses as "individuals" and the obligations they owe to one another as "mutual". In fact, nothing

-9-

in the statute refers explicitly to "sex", "women", "power" or any of the other "gendered" descriptors
deployed throughout the Attorney General's factum.

(c)
32.

Application of The Act

The sex-neutral structure of statutory support regimes like the Family Law Act has led courts

to apply their terms in sex-neutrai ways.

This Court recognized as much in Mage, where it

specifically addressed and unequivocally rejected the notion that judges should make support
assessments as ifv.-'hat is generally true of women's experiences in heterosexual relationships were
universally the case. There the Court held that, because such provisions in fact reflect "the diverse
10

dynamics" of intimate relationships, they apply "equaliy" to both spouses, "regardless of gender".

33.

What Afoge recognized in theory, the cou..>1:s
applying the terms of Part III on a daily basis

ap.preciate.full well;-d@{)endeJKies can and do develop in intimate relationships for_r.easons. that_.__~
cannot--or ca.11notonly--be traced to the imbalances of power traditionally understood to be a social
product of sex difference. The law reports are replete with instances in which judges have granted
support awards under the Family Law Act to male claimants whether or not they have suffered any
economic hardship,
20

individuals

who maintain separate residences, and even individuals

in

polygamous relationships.
, · th ) o ...
c 1 (·aen. D~,"V.,
·\
l4
th
Cuzzocrea v. Swain (1995), R.F.L. (4 ) O.CJ. (Gen. Div.)
Bredin v. Hamilton (1005), OJ. No. 3963 O.C.J. (Gen. Div.)
1G
r· h v.
· Pansn1,__'J
· ' '1 '"'93'),o/RF ... L ('3 rd), 117
0 ..C J.1__
T
Pa.is
u,
en. D:1V.)
th
Thauvette v. Afylon (1996), 23 R.F.L. (4 ) O.C.J. (Gen. Div.)
Basi v. Bhaliwa! (1992), B.CT No. 1814 (B.C. Prov. Ct)
u
h v. nough
u
·
noug

34.
30

,. 996\" _')<RF
1,_1
_, •• rL.

In the face of all this, it is difficult to fathom how Appellants ca.n possibly contend that the

legislature really oniy meant to address the "economic dependence of women resulting from their
primary role in parenting and unequal earning power" (AG's Factum p. 43), particuiarly \\<'henthe
Attorney General's ovvn Law Reform Commission considered this exact claim and rejected it as
Ur"ltrue.Indeed, the Commission displayed far more respect for the historical record of the multiple
aims behind this legislation when it described the purpose of support in the following way: "to
provide for the equitable resolution of economic disputes that arise when intimate relationships
between individuals who have been financially interdependent oreak down".
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Rights and Responsibilities of Cohabitants
Under the Family Law Act (1993) at pp. 43-4, 45 (hereinafter "OLRC Report").

40
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II
35.

ses

Rational connection is to be established through reason, logic or com..mon sense .. Scientific

evidence is of probative value in demonstrating this, but it is by no mea_ns dispositive or
detetminative.

RJR-AfcDonaid, supra, at p. 290.
36.

LEAF submits that there is no rational connection between the purposes that Part III of the

Act was meant to achieve and the means selected by the legislature to accomplish them. Reason,
10

logic, common sense and the available social scientific evidence all demonstrate that the objectives
of Ontario's support system are not served by restricting the right to apply for support to
heterosexuals alone.
37.

As a matter of simple reason and common sense, for example, it is plain that the required.

logical nexus between intention and mechanism is not present here. If the legislation were meant
to address the special economic circumstances ofheterosexuai women upon relationship breakdown,
it is incongruous that it did so by creating a system of support that is both gender-neutral on its face
and as applied.

The irrationality of this legislation is equally plain when its terms are measured

against the other objectives which the record indicates the government sought to achieve. There is
20

iittle sense in attempting to reduce the strain on the public assistance system by creating a private
right for support that is only available to a limited segment of the population of potential weifare
claimants, or to estabiish a legal framework designed to ensure that intimates deal with each other
in an economically fair fashion when they break up while i.mposing the obligation to do so on only
some.
38.

The fact that same-sex couples may have children more infrequently than heterosexual

couples does not alter this. Heterosexual couples enjoy the right to apply for support irrespective of
their reproductive capabilities and regardless of their status as parents.

Indeed, the statute itseif

makes plain that recognizing a spouse's economic contribution to the relationship, enabling a spouse
30

to become self-sufficient, relieving any hardship remaining after the coupie's property has been
divided between them, and ensuring that the economic burden of child support is shared equitably

all should be considered when making a support award.

To the extent the support laws are

concerned with the welfare of children, it is counterproductive to deny the children the benefits
which flow from an award of spousai support simply because their parents are not heterosexual.

-11-

1\foge v. Moge, supra, at p. 851-52.

17
•• ~aw
T
A ct,~- 0 . "090
ram1ly
L
, c. F
_ .5,- s. Jj--(8-).

39.

Nor do the findings of certain studies concerning the dynamics of same-sex relationships

explain why only heterosexuals should be entitied to appiy for support. All these studies show is faat
same-sex relationships are not "typically" characterized by economic dependence, and "tend" to be
more egalitarian overall, ostensibly because the division oflabour within them is "rarely" made aiong
traditional gender iines. The infrequency with which members of same-sex couples find themselves
in situations akin to those of many heterosexual women is thus no different from heterosexual men
who--notwithstanding the fact that they generally profit from the gendered division of labour-are
10

entitled to support w-hentheir individual circumstances warrant
40.

It is no answer to these irrationalities to suggest, as the Attorney General does, that inequities

between s&.'Ile-sexpartners are, by definition, not premised on "gender-based inequality in earning
pow~r". To th.~.9.:,':~ee
the statute is concerned v.,ith sex inequ~lity, it "does nothing significant at all
about the basic inequality of the sexes which exists in om society". To imply ot_herwiseis to engage
in the very manoeuvers which this Court has repeatedly declared inappropriate: "it is not open to
government to assert post facto a purpose which did not animate the legislation in the first place."
Hansard, November 18, 1976, at p. 4821.
Irwin Toy Ltd. v" Quebec (Attorney General), supra, at p. 984.

20

41.

Moreover, the notion that sex inequality accounts for the few instances where heterosexual

men become dependent on their female spouses is absurd. It is women wno overwhelmingiy bear
the brunt of performing household labour, who spend more time tending to the needs of children,
whose work in the public sphere is underpaid, and whose work in the private sphere is undervalued.
Men are the beneficiaries of this system, not its victims. Male economic dependency upon women
may be a result of other sorts of systemic inequalities played out on an individual basis, but this
occms in spite of their sex, not because of it.
30

Indeed, to insist that sex is solely responsible for the imbalances of economic power that arise
between heterosexual intimates is to engage in the kind of reductionism this Court has recently
cautioned against. Inequality in contemporary society is the product of a confluence of many sources
of systemic disadvantage, including racism, sexism, lesbianism and so forth. It is a fiction to
maintain that differences apart from, in addition to, or in combination with sex have no impact on
the way couples arrange their economic affairs while together, or on their relative economic positions

once their reiationships end. While some of these "differences" may be individual or idiosyncratic,
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many of them partake of the saxne systemic quality as sex and pmduce the sai.T!.esort of systemic
disadvantage.
Afossop, supra, at pp. 645~646.
43.

In Slllll,LEAF submits that this is a classic case oflegislative under-inclusion which cru1not

be explained on the basis of reason, logic or common sense and which, consequentiy, is unjustified
under the Constitution.

III
44.

The Definition of S use Does Not Im
Minimallv As Possible

ts

of Lesbians As

It is incumbent upon government, when it acts in a way that impairs constitutional rights, to

do so in a manner that impairs those rights "as minimally as possible." If reasonable meru1s are
available by which it cai.--1
achieve its goals without infringing constitutional rights, it must choose
those memis

over
others~

R. v. Oakes, supra, at p. 139.
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86 at pp. 52-59.

20

45.

LEAF urges LhisCourt to reject Appellant's contention that it has met its burden under this

branch of the proportionality analysis. Extending the right to apply for support to lesbians would not
thwart the realization of any of the threefold goals behind the Act and in fact would positively
advance some of them. Even assuming that extending the support provisions to srune-sex couples
would conflict with the statute's underlying goals, the impairment of lesbians' equality rights
engendered by the government's denial of the bare right to apply for support is substantial: without
access to Part III of the Act, lesbians are left with corri.mon law and equitabie remedies of dubious

application and limited scope. This situation is particuiarly problematic in

fill

era when state

economic support for individuals--including iesbians--is being eroded.
30

(a)

46.

Deference Is Not Appropriate

LEAF submits that this is not a case where the impugned provisions should be measured

against the more deferential standard first articulated in Irwin Toy. When the governments of this
country constitutionaliy enshrined the guarantee of equality embodied in s. 15, they took on the
responsibiiity of iegislating in a ma..'lllerthat ensured equality, even in arenas with which they
previousiy may have had the "privilege" of being unfamiliar. Having embraced equality as a
constitutional right and goal, it is no longer open to government twelve years after the fact to justify
discriminatory iegislation on the basis that they failed to educate themselves about those who are
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different from some presumed norm. That, however, is precisely wilat the Ontario govem_ment is
attempting to do in this case.

4 7.

In Irwin Toy, and, in fact, in every case cited by the Appellants where the more lenient

standard of review under the minimal impairment branch of the proportionality analysis has been
applied, the government was faced v.ith the claims of competing groups whose agendas were
antithetical to one another and whose demands, perforce, could not be mutually accommodated.
Invin Toy, supra, at p. 990 .
.McKinney, supra, at p. 309.
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at pp. 887-890.

10

48.

The situation in the present case could not be more different. Here, lesbian reservations about

the risks of assimilation posed by inclusion as "spouses" within the existing family iaw system have
been voiced by members of the sa_!Jleconstitutionally relevant group whose interests are coextensive:
to the degree that differences of opinion exist, they turr1 on how best to promote lesbians: equality
interests in an unequal society, not whether to promote them at all. Moreover, had Ontario engaged
in this debate in a meaningful way, it would have discovered that iesbians' different views could be
accommodated without sacrificing the aims of the legisiation or jeopardizing the interests of its
dominant beneficiaries.

20
49.

Some lesbians have raised concerns, inherent in any discussion concerning the scope of

familial obligations, about the privatizing effects ofinclusion within the Family Law Act: the more
that private remedies for economic disadvantage are created for some, the less responsibility the
government may accept for the economic weli-being of ail individuals. However, in the Clli'Tentera
of economic retrenchment by government, these concerns may be somevvhat moot. In any case, few
such lesbians wouid advocate outright exclusion of lesbians from the Act on these grounds.
Susan Boyd, "Best Friends or Spouses? Privatization and the Recognition of Lesbian
Reiationships in Af. v. H" (1996), 13 Can. J. Fam. L. 321, at pp. 335-39.
See also Martha Minow, "All In The Family & In All Families: Membership, Loving and
Owing" (1993), 95 W. Va. L. Rev. 275, at p. 308.

30
50.

Other lesbians have resisted inclusion within the Family Law Act for fear that they wiH be

compelled to present their relationships as if they were just like heterosexual ones in order to take
advantage of its provisions.

Those whose relationships ieast resemble heterosexual ones, so the

argument goes, will thus be unfairly deprived of the Act's protections and suffer the compounded
indignity of being stigmatized as too different to deserve law's basic rights and remedies.

This
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concern, however, rests upon a misunderstanding

of the different proof requirements between a

constitutional equality chailenge to the Act and its everyday application in individual cases.
Brenda Cossman and Bruce Ryder, Gay, Lesbian and Unmarried Heterosexual Couples and
the Family Law Act: Accommodating a Diversity ofFamily Forms, Research Paper prepared
for the Ontario Law Reform Commission, June, 1993, at pp. 135-39.
Nancy Polikoff, "We Will Get \Vhat We Ask For: \Vhy Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage
Will Not 'Dismantle the Legai Structure of Gender in Every Marriage"' (1993), 79 Va. L.
Rev. 1535, at p. 1546.
Paula Ettelbrick, "Since Vv'henIs Marriage a Path to Liberation?'', in Suzanne Sherman (ed.),
Lesbian and Gay }.farriage (1992) 20, at p. 21.

10
SL

Early in the history of s. 15 litigation in this country, it was widely believed that iitigants were

effectively compelled to fashion their claims according to the similarly situated model of equaiity
in order to attract the courts' sympathy, and ultimately, their constitutional approval. Most cases in
which lesbians and gays sought inclusion within extant statutory regimes therefore emphasized that
"homosexual 0relatiqnships arejndistiugµi~ble

:6:otn"heterosexual" ones in terms.of commitment,

longevity, fidelity, dependence or interdependence, and so on. Given this Court's repeated assertions
that similarity of situation is not the measure of entitiement to equality rights under s. 15, there is
simply no need for lesbian litigants to portray their intimate relationships--as the Respondent M. has
20

done (at p.12-13) as if they were 'just like" their heterosexual counterparts in order to challenge
their exclusion from legislation like the Family Law Act.

MaryEaton, "Lesbians, Gays and the Struggle for Equaiity Rights: Reversing the Progressive
. " (19941
H ypot h es1s
•
" 17
• Dal . L .J. p .•t .,"'O, at pp. 1-,.,
1.,-_-6
t .
Peter Rusk, "Same Sex Spousal Benefits and the Evolving Conception of Family" (1993),
52 U. ofT. Fae. L. Rev. 170, at o. 196.
Didi Herman, "Are We Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women's Liberation" (1990), 28
Osgoode Hall L J. 789, at p. 794-97.
Andrews, supra, at p.165-168
}.fcKinney, supra, at p.279

30
52.

More to the point, this concern misperceives what an applicant for spousal support would be

required to show in order to apply for spousal support. Without the constitutionally offensive words,
ss. 1(1) and 29 of the Act require only that an applicant for support show that he or she had cohabited
continuously for a period of not less than three years or in a relationship of some permanence if they
are the natural or adoptive parents of a child. There is nothing in these basic statutory requirements
that would compel a lesbian applicant to present her reiationship to the cou...rtas if, but for the sex of
her partner, it was "just like" heterosexual ones.

40

53.

By the same token, there is nothing inherently "heterosexuai" about the guideiines to wnich

courts are to refer in determining the amount and duration of support to award in individual cases.

-15-

1i~s Professor

Minow has observed, the "risk of dependency is real for each of us", whatever our

sexual identification.

However, given that even facially neutrai laws (including those contained

within family law legislation) have been historically applied to gay men and lesbians in a
discriminatory mfilL."ler,
lesbians have cause to worry that judges accustomed to dealing with the
particular dynamics that tend to develop between heterosexual women and men may be ill-prepared
to deal with relationships with which t.h.eyhave no familiarity and may, as a result, fail back on
unsupported presuppositions about what iesbian relationships are like or should be. Still, the concern
that the substantive provisions of Part III will be interpreted to reflect presumed characteristics about
heterosexual relationships which are ill-suited to lesbian relationships is not something which the
government is entitled to rely upon to justify what it has done here.
10

Minow, 95 W. Va. L. Rev. at p. 310.
Margaret Leopold and Wendy King, "Compulsory Heterosexuality, Lesbians, and the Law:
The Case for Constitutional Protection" (i985), l C.J.W.L. 163, at pp. 170-76.
54.

Since Slaight Communications, it has been well settled that adjudicators exercising a statutory

grant of discretionary power like that contained in s. 33(9) of the Act must do so in accordance with

Charter values, including those underlying s. 15. Those who faii to abide by their constitutional
obligation to do so by exercising their discretion in a discriminatory fashion commit an error oflaw
reversible upon review.
20

Government is not entitled to presume otherwise, fur less to justify

discriminatory legisiation on this basis.

Slaight Communications, supra, at p. 1078.
Dagenais, supra, at p. 911.
Eldridge, supra.
5 5.

In any event, those lesbians who truiy believe that judges will not act impartially or wbo, for

reasons of their

OV\!TI, wish

to govern their relationships by standards different than those set out in

the Act, would have the option of taking advantage of the contracting out provisions of the Act. The
purpose of these provisions is to allow couples the freedom to determine the contours of their
30

relationships without undue interterence by govem_ment. As long as lesbians are permitted to make
their own agreements pursuant to such provisions--and the judges called upon to review them do so
in a way that is mindful of lesbian specificity--there is no reason why the fear of assimilation need
necessarily become a reality.
56.

In summary, LEAF submits that govemment should not be permitted to exploit the

differences of political opinion that exist between members of equality-seeking groups to excuse its
own unconstitutional inaction. To allow government to insist that such groups present a uniform
front before it will take any steps to redress discrimination against them or otherwise promote their

-16-

equality interests, is to hold disempowered groups to a standard which is impossible to meet as a
practical matter. In addition, given government's established record of legislating in the face of
sometimes vehement opposition--for example, extension of support rights to heterosexual, commonlaw relationships has always been controversial--its insistence that lesbians and gays reach consensus
before a.'ly of them can pursue support claims under the Act seems plainly discriminatory as well.
Winifred Holland, "Introduction". in Winifred H. Holland and Barbro E. Stalbecker-Pout:nev
(eds.), Cohabitation: The Law in,Canada (looseleaf)
•

(b)

The Avaiiable Non-Statutory Remedies Are Inadequate

10
57.

The standard of minimal impairment applicable in this case requires that the legislature

choose the means that is least restrictive of the equality rig_hts of lesbians co!Ih"'Ilensurate with
achieving the purposes behind the legislation. LEAF submits that the remedies available under the
law of contract and the relief avaiiable under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment do not
constitute reasonable alternatives to access to t.lie statutory support regime contained in the Act.
Without the right to apply for support under Part III, therefore, the rights of lesbians have not been
"minimally impaired" and the infringing measure must be declared unconstitutional.

58.
20

With respect to the law of contracts, for example, it was dear at the time the Act was enacted

that domestic contracts were not enforceable at common law because the cou...'1:sconsidered
cohabitation or sexual services to be inadequate consideration.

Wnere the courts have enforced

domestic contracts between same-sex couples, they have tended to do so where the agreement
resembles a business affair more than a love affair:

"Only if the partners' agreement does not

reference their romantic relationship--as long as they are willing to be closeted--will it be enforced
as a contract"

Hansard, November 23, 1976, at pp. 4950-51.
Fender v. St. John Afildmay [1937], 3 All E.R. 402 (H.L.).
OLRC Report, supra, at p. 33.
Sewardv. A{entrup, 622 NE.2d 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), at p. 758.
Jones v. Daley, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981), at p. 134.

30

Martha M. Ertman, "Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, But Not
Hell Either" (1996), 73 Denv. U. L Rev. 1107, at p. 1139.

59.

Whether or not that position has changed, it remains the case that traditional common law

doctrines governing review of such agreements are not particularly well-suited to the domestic
context: s11chrules do not go far enough to preclude enforcement of a contract which is the result
of an imbalance in bargaining power between intimates, or is otherwise unfair or inconsistent \\rith
public policy. Recognizing this, the legislature enacted a series of provisions now contained in Part
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IV oftheAct(entitled

"Domestic Contracts") that deem such contracts to be valid and empower the

courts to review them against a set of standards uniquely tailored to the domestic conte:\'t

Hansard, November 23, 1976, at pp. 4950-51.
60.

Equitable remedies are no better suited to deal fully and fairly with economic disputes arising

between intimates on relationship breakdown.

Although an action for unjust enrichment may be

founded on indirect or non-financial contributions to the acquisition, maintenance, or preservation
of an asset held in the n&'Ile of the other spouse, it requires the applicant to demonstrate personal
deprivation, his or her spouse's corresponding enrichment, and the absence of a juristic reason for
10

that enrichment.

The circumstances

in which an award for quantum meruit damages or a

constructive trust may be made are thus far na.rrower than those in which a support award may be
made. Moreover, the imposition of a constructive trust is in fact a division of property, and the Act
clearly recognizes that entitlement to property division is in addition to, and not in lieu of,
entitlement to support. Indeed, s. 33(8) of the Act specifically provides that support awards may be
made to remedy any financial hardship remaining after a couple's property has been distributed
between them. In sum, support awards are broader and more flexible than, and driven by objectives
independent of, remedies available for unjust enrichment.

Peter v. Beblow, [1993] i S.C.R. 980.
OLRC Report, supra, at pp. 10-11.

20
61.

When the Ontario legislature enacted Part III, it did so in part because the remedies available

under the law of contract and the law of trusts had proved inadequate to meet the needs of those left
in a vulnerable economic position upon relationship breakdown.

The costs of pursuing these

remedies are notoriously high and legal aid may not be available to those who car,...nototherwise
afford to pursue them. In addition, because neither can be obtained on an interim basis, even those
who have the economic wherewithal to com...'llence a suit asserting such claims are often left
financiallv.., drained bv., the time their claims are resolved .
30

62.

The inadequacy of the common law and equitable remedies as alternatives to support are

particularly pronounced for lesbians. As women, lesbians are subjected to sex-based discrimination
in the labour market. Both lesbians and heterosexual women thus tend to be less financialiy secure
than men, especially those men who suffer no systemic disadvantage on any of s. i S's emnnerated
or anaiogous grounds. It is particularly ironic, therefore, that the government would attempt to justify
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its exclusion of lesbian \vomen from Part III on the basis t._hatthey caI1always take advantage of the
very remedies it recognized were inade,quate to meet the needs of heterosexual women.

(c)

63.

The Harm to Lesbians Done By Excluding Them From Part III Is Not Outweighed
By Protection Granted To Heterosexual Woman and Men

To survive constitutional review, there "must be a proportionality between the deleterious

effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the rights or :freedoms in question and the
objective, and there must be a

between the eleterio

and sai

effects of the

measures."

Dagenais, supra, at p. 889 (emphasis in original).
64.

In LEAF's submission, the harms engendered by this legislation are not clearly outweighed

by its actual beneficial effects. The injury done to those who have been excluded from Part Ill
because they are engaged in lesbian and gay relationships could hardly be more pronounced:
only must they suffer the indignity of having their relationships

not

denigrated as unimportant,

inconsequential or worse, sick and depraved, denying them the right to even apply for support leaves
same-sex couples with no alternative but to attempt to resolve their economic affairs under the costly
and inadequate rubrics of contract and trust.

20
65.

This complete and utter denial of any meaningful right of redress C&'L..riot
be justified where--

as here--the statute has not achieved what it set out to do. As the Attorney General's own statistics
show (AG's Factum at p. 21-25), the statute has failed to ensure that women are adequately
compensated for their work by the men with whom they have had intimate relationships.

It is no answer to any of this to claim that the legislature was engaged in a process of
incremental reform and should not be forced to embrnce too much change too quickly. In 1982 when
66.

the Charter was promulgated, the legislature was granted a grace period of three years (pursuant to
s.32(2)) to bring its laws into conformity with the equality guarantee contained ins. 15(1). During
30

that entire time--and the thirteen years that have elapsed since then--Ontario never undertook a
thorough examination of whether restricting the reach of each of the nun1erous statutes compiled
in the Appendix to the Attorney General's Factum to those in heterosexual relationships could be
justified in light of their specific purposes.
67.

Bili 167 is not an exception to this abdication by the Ontario government ofits constitutional

responsibilities; it is an illustration of it. There is nothing "incremental" about &".iattempt to effect
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a \.\hoiesale transformation of existing law through the introduction of an omnibus bil! doomed to
fail eariy on in the legislative process. Lndeed, any claim that this Bill proves that the government
sought a gradual extension of support law to sa..'Tie-sexcouples is conclusively belied by the fact that
the bill did not attract any discussion of the desirability or ramifications of extending the support
laws to same-sex couples, let alone deliberation of the inequities of restricting the support laws to
heterosexuals or the justifications for them.

See Hansards, May 19, 1994, at pp. 6453-54: June 1, 1994, at pp. 6572-88; June 2, 1994, at
pp. 6623-42; June 6, 1994, at pp. 6663-78; and June 9, 1994, at pp. 6791-810
10

68.

By the sa..'Tietoken, the concern that extending the support laws to those engaged in lesbian

or gay relationships will result in an endless stream of challenges to the restrictive spousal definitions
in the Family Lmv Act and other legislation does not withstand scrutiny. Only those individuals
whose exclusion in___fringes
a Charter guaranteed right or freedom can launch the kind of challenges
that Ontario apparently fears. Even if the government were faced with nUi"TierousCharter challenges
to a statute, that can sureiy be no justification fur its unconstitutionality.

If the numbers of potential

claims prove to be large, that may indicate that the legislation--which government is obligated to
defend against the standards of s. 1-- is fundamentally constitutionally unsound.
69.
20

For all of these reasons, LEAF submits that the harm to lesbians and gay men engendered by

their exclusion from Part HI of the Act is not outweighed by either the limited benefits the iegislation
actualiy confers on heterosexuals or by the aims the government claims it mea..,_tto achieve in
enacting the statute in its present form.

D.

THE ONLY APPROPRIATE REMEDY IS TO TEMPORARILY SUSPEND
STRIKING THE OFFENDING LANGUAGE FROM THE STATUTE

70.

Although s. 29 of the Family Law Act discriminates against lesbians and gay men contrary

to s. 15 for reasons that are neither reasonable nor demonstrably justified, it would be inappropriate,
in LEAF's submission, simply to sever the offending portions of that section. Without the impugned
30

words, s. 29 would allow lesbians and gays who meet the other requirements of the section--marriage
or cohabitation for three years or in a relationship of some permanence if they are natural or adoptive
parents--to appiy for support and obtain it in appropriate circumstances.

That remedy, however,

would impose an obligation on those engaged in a lesbian or gay relationship to provide support
without ailowing them to take advantage of the domestic contract provisions contained in the Act
As demonstrated above, this problem is more than one of formal inequality between those in
heterosexual and same-sex relationships:

lesbians' and gays' right to equaiity is violated in a
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substantive sense so long as they are denied the right to define for themselves the contours of their
relationships and the obligations they feel they owe to one another. Accordingly, LEAF urges this
Court to suspend striking down the unconstitutional portion of s. 29 of the Act for a period of six
months to allow the legislature to make the necessary amendments to the relevant provisions of Part

PART IV - ORDER REQUESTED

71 ~
L

10

Wherefore,LEAF begs this Court to issue an order:
declaring that the definition of spouse in s.29 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.F.3
infringes s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;

11.

declaring the infringement is not demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society
pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter;

n1.

declaring that the words "either of a man and woman" contained in s.29 of the Family Law
Act are of no force or effect pursuant to s.52 of the Charter and that the words "two

persons" be substituted therefor; and
IV.

20

suspending the declaration of invalidity in paragraph (iii) above for a period of six months
from the date of this Order to enable the Legislature of the Province of Ontario to bring
the provisions set forth in Part IV of the Family Law Act into conformity wit.11this
judgment.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
March 12, 1998

30
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